Abstract
One of the main strategies to control the spread of infectious animal diseases is the implementation of movement restrictions. This paper shows a loss in efficiency of the movement restriction policy (MRP) when behavioral responses of farmers are taken into account. Incorporating the strategic behavior of farmers in an epidemiologic model reveals that the MRP can trigger premature animal sales by farms at high risk of becoming infected that significantly reduce the efficacy of the policy. The results are validated in a parameterized network via Monte Carlo simulations and measures to mitigate the loss of efficiency of the MRP are discussed. Financial aid to farmers can be justified by public health concerns, not only for equity. This paper contributes to developing an interdisciplinary analytical framework regarding the expansion of infectious diseases combining economic and epidemiologic dimensions.
Keywords
anmal health economics; France; public policy; epidemiology;
JEL codes
- H23: Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- I18: Government Policy • Regulation • Public Health
- Q12: Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
Reference
James K. Hammitt, Didier Raboisson, Damian Tago, and Alban Thomas, “The Impact of Farmers’ Strategic Behavior on the Spread of Animal Infectious Diseases”, Plos One, vol. 11, n. 6, June 2016.
See also
Published in
Plos One, vol. 11, n. 6, June 2016