Document de travail

Monetary Policy and Endogenous Financial Crises

Fabrice Collard, Frédéric Boissay, Jordi Galì et Cristina Manea

Résumé

Should a central bank deviate from price stability to promote financial stability? We study this question through the lens of a textbook New Keynesian model augmented with capital accumulation and search–for–yield behaviors that give rise to endogenous financial crises. Our main findings are fourfold. First, monetary policy affects the probability of a crisis both in the short run (through aggregate demand) and in the medium run (through savings and capital accumulation). Second, the central bank can lower the probability of a crisis and increase welfare compared to strict inflation targeting by responding to output and an index of financial fragility (the “yield gap”) in addition to inflation. Third, “backstop” policy rules that prevent credit market collapses can further increase welfare. Fourth, financial crises may occur after a long period of unexpectedly loose monetary policy as the central bank abruptly reverses course.

Mots-clés

Financial crisis; monetary policy;

Codes JEL

  • E1: General Aggregative Models
  • E3: Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
  • E6: Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
  • G01: Financial Crises

Référence

Fabrice Collard, Frédéric Boissay, Jordi Galì et Cristina Manea, « Monetary Policy and Endogenous Financial Crises », TSE Working Paper, n° 21-1277, décembre 2021, révision avril 2023.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 21-1277, décembre 2021, révision avril 2023