Résumé
Performance evaluation (“rating”) systems not only provide information to users but also motivate the rated worker. This article solves for the optimal (effort-maximizing) rating within the standard career concerns framework. We prove that this rating is a linear function of past observations. The rating, however, is not a Markov process, but rather the sum of two Markov processes. We show how it combines information of different types and vintages. An increase in effort may adversely affect some (but not all) future ratings.
Mots-clés
Career concerns; Mechanism design; Ratings;
Codes JEL
- C72: Noncooperative Games
- C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
Remplace
Johannes Hörner et Nicolas Lambert, « Motivational Ratings », TSE Working Paper, n° 20-1134, août 2020.
Référence
Johannes Hörner et Nicolas Lambert, « Motivational Ratings », The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 88, juillet 2021, p. 1892–1935.
Publié dans
The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 88, juillet 2021, p. 1892–1935