Document de travail

Separation versus Integration in International Rail Markets

A Theoretical Investigation

Guido Friebel, Marc Ivaldi et Jérôme Pouyet

Résumé

This paper investigates various options for the organization of the railway industry when network operators require the access to multiple national networks to provide international (freight or passenger) transport services. The EU rail system provides a framework for our analysis. Returns-to-scale and the intensity of competition are key to understanding the impact of vertical integration or separation between infrastructure and operation services within each country in the presence of international transport services. We also consider an option in which a transnational infrastructure manager is in charge of offering a coordinated access to the national networks. In our model, it turns out to be an optimal industry structure.

Mots-clés

Regulation; competition; vertical integration; rail passenger transportation;

Codes JEL

  • L51: Economics of Regulation
  • L92: Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
  • R48: Government Pricing and Policy

Référence

Guido Friebel, Marc Ivaldi et Jérôme Pouyet, « Separation versus Integration in International Rail Markets: A Theoretical Investigation », TSE Working Paper, n° 11-248, 18 juillet 2011, révision mars 2013.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 11-248, 18 juillet 2011, révision mars 2013