Codes JEL
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- L24: Contracting Out • Joint Ventures • Technology Licensing
- Q12: Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
- K32: Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- L51: Economics of Regulation
Remplace
Pierre Dubois et Tomislav Vukina, « Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data », IDEI Working Paper, n° 393, décembre 2008.
Référence
Pierre Dubois et Tomislav Vukina, « Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data », International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 27, n° 4, juillet 2009, p. 489–552.
Publié dans
International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 27, n° 4, juillet 2009, p. 489–552