Résumé
In this paper, we show that ambiguity aversion always raises the demand for self-insurance and the insurance coverage, but may de- crease the demand for self-protection. We also characterize the opti- mal insurance design under ambiguity aversion, and exhibit a case in which the straight deductible contract is optimal as in the expected utility model.
Remplace
David Alary, Christian Gollier et Nicolas Treich, « The Effect of Ambiguity Aversion on Insurance and Self-protection », 2011, révision 9 juillet 2012.
Référence
David Alary, Christian Gollier et Nicolas Treich, « The Effect of Ambiguity Aversion on Insurance and Self-protection », The Economic Journal, vol. 123, n° 573, décembre 2013, p. 1188–1202.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
The Economic Journal, vol. 123, n° 573, décembre 2013, p. 1188–1202