Résumé
The purpose of this note is to compute the probability of logrolling for three different probabilistic cultures. The primary finding is that the restriction of preferences to be in accord with the condition of separable preferences creates enough additional structure among voters' preference rankings to create an increase in the likelihood that a Condorcet winner will exist with both IC and IAC-based scenarios.
Mots-clés
Condorcet; Separable preferences; Logrolling; Vote Trading;
Codes JEL
- D71: Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations
- D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Remplace
William Gehrlein, Michel Le Breton et Dominique Lepelley, « The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting », TSE Working Paper, n° 17-755, janvier 2017.
Référence
William Gehrlein, Michel Le Breton et Dominique Lepelley, « The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting », Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49, 2017, p. 315–321.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49, 2017, p. 315–321