Abstract
This study analyzes the relationship between mid-sized blockholders and firm risk. We show that ownership structure matters for firm risk, beyond the first largest blockholder. Firms with multiple blockholders take more risk than firms with just one blockholder, even when controlling for the stake of the largest blockholder. Consistent with the diversification argument, we find that firm risk increases by 22% when the number of blockholders increases from one to two. Our results are robust to controlling for blockholder type and firm characteristics. We carry out various robustness checks to tackle endogeneity issues. More generally, we provide evidence that firms’ decisions are affected by mid-sized blockholders, and not merely the largest blockholder. This is in line with theoretical predictions.
Keywords
Corporate Governance; Ownership Structure; Firm Risk; Blockholders; Volatility of Operating Performance;
JEL codes
- G11: Portfolio Choice • Investment Decisions
- G30: General
- G32: Financing Policy • Financial Risk and Risk Management • Capital and Ownership Structure • Value of Firms • Goodwill
- G34: Mergers • Acquisitions • Restructuring • Corporate Governance
Replaced by
Silvia Rossetto, Nassima Selmane, and Raffaele Staglianò, “Ownership concentration and firm risk: The moderating role of mid-sized blockholders”, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, vol. 50, n. 1-2, February 2023, pp. 377–410.
Reference
Silvia Rossetto, Nassima Selmane, and Raffaele Staglianò, “Ownership concentration and firm risk: The moderating role of mid-sized blockholders”, TSE Working Paper, n. 22-1346, June 2022.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 22-1346, June 2022