Nonviolent repression in electoral autocracies

Abstract

Preventive repression is most effective when it is invisible. Yet contemporary autocrats often publicize their attempts, and failure, to prevent dissent. This work develops and tests a theory of how publicized preventive repression aids autocracies. I propose that autocrats’ decision to publicize repression, even when repression does not deter dissent, shapes the public’s beliefs and behaviours. Focusing on Russia since 2012, the work weaves together data on thousands of protests, media records, and public opinion surveys to show how the Russian authorities use protest permits to shape the public’s views of the opposition, hinder street coalitions, and secure their rule. This nuanced analysis shows how 21st century repression blurs the boundaries between propaganda as a tool of persuasion and repression as a tool of fear. With compelling theory and original evidence that spans a decade, the research will interest scholars of authoritarian regimes, social movements, Russian politics, and political violence.