JEL codes
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- L24: Contracting Out • Joint Ventures • Technology Licensing
- Q12: Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
- K32: Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- L51: Economics of Regulation
Replaced by
Pierre Dubois, and Tomislav Vukina, “Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 27, n. 4, July 2009, pp. 489–552.
Reference
Pierre Dubois, and Tomislav Vukina, “Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data”, IDEI Working Paper, n. 393, December 2008.
See also
Published in
IDEI Working Paper, n. 393, December 2008