Simple Centrifugal Incentives in Spatial Competition

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of introducing centrifugal incentives in an otherwise standard Downsian model of electoral competition. First, we demonstrate that a symmetric equilibrium is guaranteed to exist when centrifugal incentives are induced by any kind of partial voter participation (such as abstention due to indifference, abstention due to alienation, etc.) and, then, we argue that: a) this symmetric equilibrium is in pure strategies, and it is hence convergent, only when centrifugal incentives are sufficiently weak on both sides; b) when centrifugal incentives are strong on both sides (when, for example, a lot of voters abstain when they are su¢ ciently indifferent between the two candidates) players use mixed strategies - the stronger the centrifugal incentives, the larger the probability weight that players assign to locations near the extremes; and c) when centrifugal incentives are strong on one side only - say for example only on the right - the support of players'mixed strategies contain all policies except from those that are su¢ ciently close to the left extreme.

Keywords

Replaced by

Didier Laussel, Michel Le Breton, and Dimitrios Xefteris, “Simple Centrifugal Incentives in Spatial Competition”, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 46, n. 2, May 2017, pp. 357–381.

Reference

Didier Laussel, Michel Le Breton, and Dimitrios Xefteris, “Simple Centrifugal Incentives in Spatial Competition”, TSE Working Paper, n. 16-618, February 2016.