Working paper

Correlation, Partitioning and the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote under the Majority Rule

Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley, and Hatem Smaoui

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to estimate the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule for a class of random electorate models encompassing the celebrated Impartial Culture (IC) and Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) models. The emphasis is on the impact of correlation across votes on the order of magnitude of this event. Our proof techniques use arguments from probability theory on one hand and combinatorial and algorithmic tools for counting integer points inside convex polytopes on the other hand.

Keywords

Elections; Power Measurement; Voting; Random Electorate;

JEL codes

  • D71: Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations
  • D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

Replaced by

Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley, and Hatem Smaoui, “Correlation, Partitioning and the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote under the Majority Rule”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 64, May 2016, pp. 11–22.

Reference

Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley, and Hatem Smaoui, “Correlation, Partitioning and the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote under the Majority Rule”, TSE Working Paper, n. 16-622, February 2016.

See also

Published in

TSE Working Paper, n. 16-622, February 2016