Working paper

A Note on Lobbying a Legislature

Vera Zaporozhets

Abstract

We study a simple in?uence game, in which a lobby tries to manipulate the decision of a legislature via monetary offers to one or more members. We compute the minimum budget needed for the lobby to pass the bill and the distribution of this budget between the legislators. We also show the connection of the problem to the combinatorial optimization.

Keywords

Legislative lobbying; Combinatorial optimization; Knapsack problem;

JEL codes

  • C61: Optimization Techniques • Programming Models • Dynamic Analysis
  • D71: Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations
  • D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

Reference

Vera Zaporozhets, “A Note on Lobbying a Legislature”, TSE Working Paper, n. 16-673, July 2016.

See also

Published in

TSE Working Paper, n. 16-673, July 2016