Research Waves

Abstract

Competing research lines start and grow as information is gradually uncovered by scientists who choose their fields driven by career incentives. We build a strategic experimentation framework in which agents irreversibly specialize in one of two risky fields, and information updates arrive more frequently as more agents specialize in a field. We describe the equilibrium forces that determine the size, shape, and length of such "research waves". In the 'bad news' case, all researchers specialize in one field, generating a unique bandwagon wave. As the difference in priors increases, such wave starts earlier and grows more slowly. In the 'good news' case, both fields can be explored in equilibrium in two sequential surges. The probability of both fields being investigated increases in the researcher's mass and in the efficacy of technology. Finally, we assess the impact of citations benefits, tenure clocks, and grants on the structure of the equilibrium waves.