Abstract
The rise of new information technologies and the opening to competition of previously monopolized sectors have induced more dynamic pricing practices, in particular the development of loyalty rewards. We aim at looking at the economic motivations and impacts of this new trend, in particular with regards to effective competition and consumer welfare. First, we explain that, in a monopolistic setting, loyalty rewards can induce more consumption and benefit both firms and consumers. Then, in a duopolistic setting, we show that behavior-based price discrimination increases effective competition and benefits consumers. At last, we discuss the pro- or anti- competitive impacts of related practices, such as long-term contracting and retention offers.
Keywords
fidélisation; concurrence imparfaite; discrimination en prix;
JEL codes
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- L1: Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L40: General
Reference
Wilfried Sand-Zantman, “Analyse économique des pratiques de fidélisation”, Revue Française d'Économie, vol. XXVIII, n. 3, 2014, pp. 37–70.
See also
Published in
Revue Française d'Économie, vol. XXVIII, n. 3, 2014, pp. 37–70