Abstract
The paper makes the case for a systematic ex-ante assessment of the distributional impact of efficiency enhancing innovations regulatory sandboxes are expected to test. It shows how their prior formal modeling can inform on the possible need to control in the sandbox design for otherwise underestimated but predictable distributional effects. Failing to do so is likely to lead to underestimate efficiency-equity trade-offs and other distributional issues. This may influence the political sustainability of otherwise potentially welfare enhancing innovations. Simple industrial organization models will often suffice to identify the potential issues at the design stage
Keywords
Regulatory sandboxes; innovation; governance; anti-trust; regulation; efficiency; equity; quality standards.;
JEL codes
- K20: General
- K21: Antitrust Law
- K23: Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L12: Monopoly • Monopolization Strategies
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L15: Information and Product Quality • Standardization and Compatibility
- L51: Economics of Regulation
- O31: Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O33: Technological Change: Choices and Consequences • Diffusion Processes
Replaces
Claude Crampes, and Antonio Estache, “Efficiency vs. equity concerns in regulatory sandboxes”, TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1466, September 2023.
Reference
Claude Crampes, and Antonio Estache, “Efficiency vs. distributional concerns in regulatory sandboxes”, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, February 2025, pp. 1–26.
See also
Published in
Journal of Economic Policy Reform, February 2025, pp. 1–26