Résumé
In a number of interesting environments, dynamic screening involves positive selection: in contrast with Coasian dynamics, only the most motivated remain over time. The paper provides conditions under which the principal's commitment optimum is time consistent and uses this result to derive testable predictions under permanent or transient shocks. It also identifies environments in which time consistency does not hold despite positive selection, and yet simple equilibrium characterizations can be obtained.
Mots-clés
Repeated relationships; screening; positive selection; time consistency; shifting preferences; exit games;
Codes JEL
- C72: Noncooperative Games
- D42: Monopoly
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Remplace
Jean Tirole, « From Bottom of the Barrel to Cream of the Crop: Sequential Screening with Positive Selection », TSE Working Paper, n° 16-672, juillet 2016.
Référence
Jean Tirole, « From Bottom of the Barrel to Cream of the Crop: Sequential Screening with Positive Selection », Econometrica, vol. 84, n° 4, juillet 2016, p. 1291–1343.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
Econometrica, vol. 84, n° 4, juillet 2016, p. 1291–1343