Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation

Résumé

This paper revisits two classical problems in the theory of voting—viz. the divided majority problem and the strategic revelation of information—in the light of evolutionarily founded partial Kantian morality. It is shown that, compared to electorates consisting of purely self-interested voters, such Kantian morality helps voters solve coordination problems and improves the information aggregation properties of equilibria, even for modest levels of morality.

Remplace

Ingela Alger et Jean-François Laslier, « Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation », IAST Working Paper, n° 20-118, novembre 2020, révision octobre 2021.

Ingela Alger et Jean-François Laslier, « Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation », IAST Working Paper, n° 20-118, novembre 2020, révision octobre 2021.

Référence

Ingela Alger et Jean-François Laslier, « Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation », Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 34, n° 2, mars 2022.