Résumé
We study platform markets in which the information about users' preferences is dispersed. First, we show how the dispersion of information introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty about participation decisions and how the latter shapes the elasticity of the demands and the equilibrium prices. We then study the effects on profits, consumer surplus, and welfare of platform design, blogs, forums, conferences, advertising campaigns, post-launch disclosures, and other information management policies affecting the agents' ability to predict participation decisions on the other side of the market.
Mots-clés
platform markets; dispersed information; design; information management; informative advertising; market ignition; global games;
Codes JEL
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Remplace
Bruno Jullien et Alessandro Pavan, « Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets », TSE Working Paper, n° 13-429, août 2013, révision novembre 2017.
Référence
Bruno Jullien et Alessandro Pavan, « Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets », The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 86, n° 4, juillet 2019, p. 1666–1703.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 86, n° 4, juillet 2019, p. 1666–1703