Résumé
Parties in financial markets, industries, compensation design or politics may negotiate on either a piecemeal or a bundled basis. Little is known about the desirability of bundling when values are common and/or information endogenous. The paper shows that bundling encourages information-equalizing investments, thereby facilitating trade. It accordingly revisits and qualifies existing knowledge on security design.
Mots-clés
Liquidity; security design; tranching; information acquisition;
Codes JEL
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- E51: Money Supply • Credit • Money Multipliers
- G12: Asset Pricing • Trading Volume • Bond Interest Rates
- G14: Information and Market Efficiency • Event Studies • Insider Trading
Remplace
Emmanuel Farhi et Jean Tirole, « Liquid Bundles », TSE Working Paper, n° 12-328, juillet 2012, révision octobre 2013.
Référence
Emmanuel Farhi et Jean Tirole, « Liquid Bundles », Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 158, juillet 2015, p. 634–655.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 158, juillet 2015, p. 634–655