Résumé
We model expressive voting as a dynamic game with informed and ignorant voters. A voter has selective memory for actions and he is aware of it. We find a unique symmetric equilibrium with ignorant voting. Public signal in favor of one particular alternative creates the bandwagon and underdog effects. When the signal is sufficiently strong, the majority outcome is biased. This is a possible reason for persistence of public policies.
Mots-clés
Expressive voting; Self-signaling; Ignorant voting; Habitual voting; Bandwagon and underdog effects; Information aggregation in elections; Status quo bias;
Codes JEL
- D03: Behavioral Microeconomics • Underlying Principles
- D71: Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief
- P16: Political Economy
Référence
Elena Panova, « A Passion for Voting », Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 90, mars 2015, p. 44–65.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 90, mars 2015, p. 44–65