Résumé
We study monopoly and duopoly pricing in a two-sided market with dispersed information about users' preferences. We first show how the dispersion of information introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty about participation rates and how the latter shapes the elasticity of the demands and thereby the equilibrium prices. We then study informative advertising campaigns and product design affecting the agents' ability to estimate their own valuations and/or the distribution of valuations on the other side of the market.
Mots-clés
two-sided markets; dispersed information; platform competition; global-games; informative advertising;
Codes JEL
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Remplacé par
Bruno Jullien et Alessandro Pavan, « Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets », The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 86, n° 4, juillet 2019, p. 1666–1703.
Référence
Bruno Jullien et Alessandro Pavan, « Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets », TSE Working Paper, n° 13-429, août 2013, révision novembre 2017.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 13-429, août 2013, révision novembre 2017