Document de travail

Compatibility Choices, Switching Costs and Data Portability: On the Role of the Non-Negative Pricing Constraint

Doh-Shin Jeon, Domenico Menicucci et Nikrooz Nasr

Résumé

We study mix-and-match compatibility choices of firms selling complementary products in a dynamic setting. In contrast to what happens in a static setting where symmetric firms choose compatibility (Matutes and Régibeau, 1988), when consumers face significant switching costs and firms can poach them by making behavior-based price discrimination, symmetric firms choose incompatibility to soften future competition. Even if this tends to harm consumers, incompatibility can increase welfare by reducing excessive switching. Data portability, by reducing switching costs, induces the firms to choose compatibility more often but, given a compatibility regime, benefits consumers only if the non-negative pricing constraint binds.

Mots-clés

Compatibility; Switching Cost; Data Portability;

Codes JEL

  • D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
  • L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
  • L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

Remplacé par

Doh-Shin Jeon, Domenico Menicucci et Nikrooz Nasr, « Compatibility Choices, Switching Costs and Data Portability », American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 15, n° 1, février 2023, p. 30–73.

Référence

Doh-Shin Jeon, Domenico Menicucci et Nikrooz Nasr, « Compatibility Choices, Switching Costs and Data Portability: On the Role of the Non-Negative Pricing Constraint », TSE Working Paper, n° 16-691, septembre 2016, révision août 2020.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 16-691, septembre 2016, révision août 2020