Résumé
We develop a dynamic equilibrium model of firm competition to analyze the effects of counterfactual policies, such as taxes and advertising restrictions, on pricing, advertising, consumption, and welfare. Using micro-level data, we estimate how consumer exposure to television commercials influences product choice and model firms' strategic competition over advertising budgets and pricing. We exploit firms' practice of delegating advertising slot decisions to agencies to link consumer-level advertising variation to firms' strategic choices. Our results show that a sugar-sweetened beverage tax reduces advertising, while the additional impact of advertising restrictions is signicantly weaker when a tax is already in place.
Mots-clés
taxation, advertising, discrete choice demand, dynamic oligopoly;
Codes JEL
- D12: Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- H22: Incidence
- I18: Government Policy • Regulation • Public Health
- M37: Advertising
Référence
Pierre Dubois, Rossi Abi Rafeh, Rachel Griffith et Martin O'Connell, « The Effects of Sin Taxes and Advertising Restrictions in a Dynamic Equilibrium », TSE Working Paper, n° 23-1480, octobre 2023, révision février 2025.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 23-1480, octobre 2023, révision février 2025