Résumé
This article focuses on the life insurance industry in France and attempts to shed light on whether the insurers behave in a competitive fashion, or whether, on the contrary, they take coordinated decisions. We propose several empirical tests, which entail the estimation of the Boone indicator, a tool which explores the relationship between firms’ relative costs and profits, the evaluation of the switching costs beard by consumers when they decide to change insurer, and the construction of a structural model, which is based on an oligopolistic framework where insurers propose differentiated products. Our results suggest unambiguously that firms do follow a competitive behavior.
Référence
Philippe Gagnepain et Marc Ivaldi, « An Evaluation of the Degree of Competition in the French Life Insurance Industry », TSE Working Paper, n° 16-697, septembre 2016.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 16-697, septembre 2016