Résumé
We use data from a platform that centralizes a day care matching process. We estimate parents’ preferences and nursery priorities by analyzing parents’ rank-ordered lists and nurseries’ acceptance decisions. We account for strategic behavior by using a novel estimation approach inspired by the dynamic discrete choice framework. We use the estimates to evaluate centralized matching policies tailored to the day care setting. We compare mechanisms and assess the effects of subsidies, increased capacity, and affirmative action. We find that affirmative action policies are crucial for boosting the participation of disadvantaged children, though they increase segregation due to location-based preferences.
Mots-clés
day care, affirmative action, segregation, centralized matching markets, CCP estimation;
Codes JEL
- C61: Optimization Techniques • Programming Models • Dynamic Analysis
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- I24: Education and Inequality
Référence
Olivier De Groote et Minyoung Rho, « Matching disadvantaged children to day care: Evidence from a centralized platform », TSE Working Paper, n° 24-1600, décembre 2024.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 24-1600, décembre 2024