Résumé
We study the development of apps on competing platforms. We show that competition leads to commissions exceeding those maximizing consumer surplus (and, a fortiori, social welfare) whenever raising one commission reduces rivals' app bases. We relate this nding to economies of scope in app development and, to illustrate it, consider a setting in which some developers can port their apps at no cost: as their proportion increases, app development is progressively choked-o. Fostering platform competition or interoperability may therefore fail to produce the desired results. Within-platform app store competition, together with appropriate access conditions, may constitute a more promising avenue.
Mots-clés
Platform competition, ad-valorem commissions, app stores, app development;
Codes JEL
- D21: Firm Behavior: Theory
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L22: Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L40: General
- L50: General
- L81: Retail and Wholesale Trade • e-Commerce
Référence
Doh-Shin Jeon et Patrick Rey, « Platform Competition and App Development », TSE Working Paper, n° 24-1566, septembre 2024.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 24-1566, septembre 2024