Theoretical economics

Catherine Bobtcheff, Raphaël Levy, and Thomas Mariotti, “Information disclosure in preemption races: Blessing or (winner's) curse?”, The RAND Journal of Economics, 2024, forthcoming.

Jean-Paul Décamps, Fabien Gensbittel, and Thomas Mariotti, “Investment timing and technological breakthroughs”, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024, forthcoming.

David Martimort, Pierre Fleckinger, and Nicolas Roux, “Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory”, Journal of Economic Literature, 2024, forthcoming.

Mariann Ollar, and Antonio Penta, “A Network Solution to Robust Implementation: the Case of Identical but Unknown Distributions”, The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 90, n. 5, October 2023, p. 2517–2554.

Thomas Mariotti, Nikolaus Schweizer, Nora Szech, and Jonas von Wangenheim, “Information Nudges and Self Control”, Management Science, vol. 69, n. 4, April 2023, pp. 2182–2197.

Takuro Yamashita, and Shuguang Zhu, “On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms”, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 14, n. 4, November 2022, pp. 494–514.

Takuro Yamashita, and Takeshi Murooka, “Adverse selection and bounded rationality: an impossibility theorem”, Japanese Economic Review, September 2022.

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, and François Salanié, “Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection”, International Economic Review, vol. 63, n. 3, August 2022, pp. 981–1020.

Takuro Yamashita, and Niccolò Lomys, A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment, EC'22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, July 2022, p. 334.

Takuro Yamashita, and Alex Smolin, Information Design in Concave Games, EC'22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, July 2022.