Takuro Yamashita

Takuro Yamashita, and Shuguang Zhu, “On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms”, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 14, n. 4, November 2022, pp. 494–514.

Takuro Yamashita, and Takeshi Murooka, “Adverse selection and bounded rationality: an impossibility theorem”, Japanese Economic Review, September 2022.

Takuro Yamashita, and Niccolò Lomys, A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment, EC'22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, July 2022, p. 334.

Takuro Yamashita, and Alex Smolin, Information Design in Concave Games, EC'22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, July 2022.

Takuro Yamashita, and Fumitoshi Moriya, “Preventing Bottlenecks in Organizations”, AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol. 112, May 2022, pp. 444–451.

Nozomu Muto, Yasuhiro Shirata, and Takuro Yamashita, “Revenue-capped efficient auctions”, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 18, n. 3, June 2020, pp. 1284–1320.

Fuhito Kojima, and Takuro Yamashita, “Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency”, Theoretical Economics, vol. 12, n. 3, 2017, pp. 1393–1438.

Takuro Yamashita, “Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies, with Applications to Auctions and Bilateral Trade”, The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 82, n. 3, 2015, pp. 1223–1246.

Takuro Yamashita, “Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 159, 2015, pp. 267–279.

Takuro Yamashita, “Mechanism Games with Multiple Principals and three or more Agents”, Econometrica, vol. 78, n. 2, March 2010, pp. 791–801.