Abstract
We study a capital market in which multiple lenders sequentially attempt at financing a single borrower under moral hazard. We show that restricting lenders to post take-it-or-leave-it offers involves a severe loss of generality: none of the equilibrium outcomes arising in this scenario survives if lenders offer menus of contracts. This result challenges the approach followed in standard models of multiple lending. From a theoretical perspective, we offer new insights on equilibrium robustness in sequential common agency games.
Keywords
Multiple Lending; Menus; Strategic Default; Common Agency; Bank Competition;
JEL codes
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- G33: Bankruptcy • Liquidation
Replaced by
Andrea Attar, Catherine Casamatta, Arnold Chassagnon, and Jean-Paul Décamps, “Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: the Role of Menus”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 51, n. 4, June 2019, pp. 977–990.
Reference
Andrea Attar, Catherine Casamatta, Arnold Chassagnon, and Jean-Paul Décamps, “Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: the Role of Menus”, TSE Working Paper, n. 17-821, June 2017.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 17-821, June 2017