How do GM / non GM coexistence regulations affect markets and welfare?

Abstract

This paper presents a theoretical economic model assessing the effects of the level of mandatory genetically modified (GM) / non-GM coexistence regulations on market and welfare outcomes. We assume vertical differentiation of GM and non-GM goods on the consumer side. Producers are heterogeneous in their production cost for GM crops. Producers of non- GM crops face a probability of having their harvest downgraded if gene flow from GM fields raises its content in GMOs (genetically modified organisms) above the labeling threshold. The government may impose on GMO producers mandatory ex ante isolation distances from non- GM fields in order to decrease the probability of non-GM harvest downgrading. It may also introduce an ex post compensation to non-GMO farmers for profit losses due to harvest downgrading, imposing GMO farmers’ participation to a compensation fund via a tax on GM seeds. Assuming endogenous crop choices and prices, we study the effects of ex ante regulation and ex post liability of GMO producers on market equilibrium, on the achievement of coexistence, and on both global and interest group welfare.

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Replaced by

Marion Desquilbet, and Sylvaine Poret, “How do GM/non GM coexistence regulations affect markets and welfare?”, European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer Netherlands, vol. 37, February 2014, pp. 51–82.

Reference

Marion Desquilbet, and Sylvaine Poret, “How do GM / non GM coexistence regulations affect markets and welfare?”, TSE Working Paper, n. 12-350, November 2012, revised June 2013.