JEL codes
- C61: Optimization Techniques • Programming Models • Dynamic Analysis
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
- D92: Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
Replaces
Bruno Biais, Thomas Mariotti, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Stéphane Villeneuve, Environmental Risk Insurance under Dynamic Moral Hazard, 2007.
Replaced by
Bruno Biais, Thomas Mariotti, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Stéphane Villeneuve, “Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard”, Econometrica, vol. 78, n. 1, January 2010, pp. 73–118.
Reference
Bruno Biais, Thomas Mariotti, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Stéphane Villeneuve, “Large Risks, Limited Liability and Dynamic Moral Hazard”, IDEI Working Paper, n. 472, August 2007, revised September 2009.
Published in
IDEI Working Paper, n. 472, August 2007, revised September 2009