Abstract
This paper extends the reputational cheap-talk model to study the effect of media market structure on the quality of news, depending on news coverage characterized by: (i) the precision of common priors and (ii) the likelihood of follow-up quality assessment. We find that competition (weakly) increases the quality of news, except when the news covers controversial issues, the quality of which is likely to remain uncertain, such as politics. Competition adversely affects the quality of such news by increasing the elasticity of demand, thereby creating incentives to confirm common priors.
Keywords
quality of news; competition; reputational cheap-talk;
JEL codes
- L82: Entertainment • Media
- L10: General
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Reference
Elena Panova, “Media market structure and confirmatory news”, TSE Working Paper, n. 24-1597, November 2024, revised March 10, 2025.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 24-1597, November 2024, revised March 10, 2025