Working paper

Supplier Fixed costs and Retail Market Monopolization

Stéphane Caprice, Vanessa von Schlippenbach, and Christian Wey

Abstract

Considering a vertical structure with perfectly competitive upstream firms that deliver a homogenous good to a differentiated retail duopoly, we show that upstream fixed costs may help to monopolize the downstream market. We find that downstream prices increase in upstream firms'fixed costs when both intra- and interbrand competition exist. Our findings contradict the common wisdom that fixed costs do not affect market outcomes.

Keywords

Fixed Costs; Vertical Contracting; Monopolization;

JEL codes

  • L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
  • L14: Transactional Relationships • Contracts and Reputation • Networks
  • L42: Vertical Restraints • Resale Price Maintenance • Quantity Discounts

Reference

Stéphane Caprice, Vanessa von Schlippenbach, and Christian Wey, “Supplier Fixed costs and Retail Market Monopolization”, TSE Working Paper, n. 14-524, July 2014.

See also

Published in

TSE Working Paper, n. 14-524, July 2014