Abstract
This paper identifies strategies to build a library consortium from a long term point of view. Contrary to the conventional wisdom to build a consortium around groups of homogenous institutions (Davis, 2002), we find that libraries with similar preferences are likely to lose from building a consortium while libraries with opposite preferences almost always gain from it. Our results suggest a strong tension between a short-term strategy and a long-term strategy as long as the former dictates forming a consortium around libraries with homogenous preferences in order to gain from quantity discounts. This tension might create a "library consortium trap".
Keywords
Library Consortium; Academic Journals; Personalized Prices; Cor- relation; Multimarket contact; Level-playing Field;
JEL codes
- D4: Market Structure and Pricing
- K21: Antitrust Law
- L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L82: Entertainment • Media
Replaced by
Doh-Shin Jeon, and Domenico Menicucci, “The Benefits of Diverse Preferences in Library Consortia”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 65, n. 1, March 2017, pp. 105–135.
Reference
Doh-Shin Jeon, and Domenico Menicucci, “The Benefits of Diverse Preferences in Library Consortia”, TSE Working Paper, n. 13-425, August 21, 2013, revised December 2015.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 13-425, August 21, 2013, revised December 2015