Résumé
This paper identifies strategies to build a library consortium from a long term point of view. Contrary to the conventional wisdom to build a consortium around groups of homogenous institutions (Davis, 2002), we find that libraries with similar preferences are likely to lose from building a consortium while libraries with opposite preferences almost always gain from it. Our results suggest a strong tension between a short-term strategy and a long-term strategy as long as the former dictates forming a consortium around libraries with homogenous preferences in order to gain from quantity discounts. This tension might create a "library consortium trap".
Mots-clés
Library Consortium; Academic Journals; Personalized Prices; Cor- relation; Multimarket contact; Level-playing Field;
Codes JEL
- D4: Market Structure and Pricing
- K21: Antitrust Law
- L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L82: Entertainment • Media
Remplacé par
Doh-Shin Jeon et Domenico Menicucci, « The Benefits of Diverse Preferences in Library Consortia », The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 65, n° 1, mars 2017, p. 105–135.
Référence
Doh-Shin Jeon et Domenico Menicucci, « The Benefits of Diverse Preferences in Library Consortia », TSE Working Paper, n° 13-425, 21 août 2013, révision décembre 2015.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 13-425, 21 août 2013, révision décembre 2015